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Economic Espionage: A Framework for a 
Workable Solution 
Mark E.A. Danielson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Economic espionage is a serious problem. In general terms, it 
is the act of targeting or acquiring trade secrets from domestic 
companies or government entities to knowingly benefit a foreign 
state.1 It differs from industrial espionage in that the activities are 
carried out or sponsored by government, as opposed to private, 
entities. States have shifted their focus from building military 
security towards achieving economic supremacy.2 Many states 
now consider economic espionage a matter of national security.3 It 
profits participants4 and saves the time and financial resources 
required to develop technologies independently.5 The effects of the 
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 1. See 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2006). 
 2. Peter Schweizer, The Growth of Economic Espionage: America is 
Target Number One, 75 FOREIGN AFF. 9, 14 (1996). 
 3. THE JOURNALISM SCHOOL, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, WERT ECONOMIC 
ESPIONAGE 4 (Nov. 11, 2005), Go to 
http://www.journalism.columbia.edu/, search “WERT Economic 
Espionage” and click on the link [hereinafter WERT]. 
 4. See, e.g., Schweizer, supra note 2, at 12 (“That so many states 
practice economic espionage is a testament to how profitable it is believed 
to be.”); see also JOHN A. NOLAN, ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE, PROPRIETARY 
INFORMATION PROTECTION: THE GOVERNMENT IS HERE TO HELP YOU – 
SERIOUSLY 2 (1997), 
http://www.hanford.gov/oci/maindocs/ci_r_docs/econesp.pdf (“It doesn’t 
take the President of the World Bank to figure out that if you spend 
$500,000 bribing a research scientist in the United States to get the trade 
secret or proprietary information that an American company has spend 
$750,000,000 developing, the intelligence operation has just netted $700 
million.”). 
 5. Karen Sepura, Economic Espionage: The Front Line of a New World 
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practice are felt globally, but it most acutely impacts U.S. 
businesses, as they have the distinction of being targeted more 
than those of other states.6 The fact that the United States spends 
more money on research and development than any other state,7 
coupled with the open nature of its economy, makes it an 
attractive target for states seeking low-cost technological 
upgrades.8 Further, the proliferation of electronically-stored 
information has made the stealing of electronic information as 
easy as the push of a button. Economic espionage diminishes a 
business’s goodwill and reputation while lessening its competitive 
advantage, core technologies, and profitability.9 States’ attempts 
to outspend one another to acquire the other’s secrets are 
ultimately wasteful.10 The problem has reached epic proportions 
and will not go away on its own.11 
This article highlights the damaging effects of economic 
espionage. It illustrates how the United States and the 
international community have tried to cope through existing 
legislation and agreements. Ultimately, it demonstrates that the 
establishment of a convention prohibiting economic espionage—
once impossible due to prevailing international attitudes towards 
competition—is now possible. The article proposes a general 
                                                          
Economic War, 26 SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. & COM. 127, 133 (1998). 
 6. Darren S. Tucker, Comment, The Federal Government’s War on 
Economic Espionage, 18 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1109, 1114–15 (1997). 
 7. Catherine Dominguez, FBI Launches Education Campaign 
Targeting “Economic Espionage,” SAN ANTONIO BUS. J., Jan. 18, 2008, 
available at 
http://sanantonio.bizjournals.com/sanantonio/stories/2008/01/21/stor
y4.html. 
 8. OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE, ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL 
ESPIONAGE 2005, at 12 (2006), available at 
http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/FECIE_2005.pdf 
[hereinafter ONCE REPORT]. 
 9. ASIS INT’L, TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION LOSS 3 (2007), 
available at http://www.asisonline.org/newsroom/surveys/spi2.pdf. 
 10. Schweizer, supra note 2, at 14. 
 11. Pamela A. MacLean, Frustrations Abound for Spycatchers, NAT’L L. 
J., May 15, 2006, at S1. FBI statements regarding the cost of economic 
espionage reference the ASIS study.  Director Robert Mueller has said 
“Theft of trade secrets and critical technologies—what we call economic 
espionage—costs our nation upwards of $250 billion a year.” Robert S. 
Mueller, Director, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Address at the Detroit 
Economic Club (Oct. 16, 2003), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/director101603.htm. 
DANIELSON MEA.  Economic Espionage: A Framework for a Workable Solution.  MINN. 
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2009;10(2): 503-548. 
2009] ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE 505 
framework for such an agreement and discusses the 
implementation problems it would encounter. 
A. ECONOMIC COSTS 
Quantifying the losses attributed to economic espionage is a 
difficult task. Thefts often go unreported to federal or state law 
enforcement agencies. Businesses may be reluctant to step 
forward and admit being targeted for a myriad of reasons. An 
admission may signal to investors that a company is unable to 
protect its valuable proprietary information.12 Such concerns are 
valid: studies have indicated that a company’s stock tends to 
decline following an admission it has been struck by economic 
espionage.13 An admission may compromise joint ventures or 
forestall lucrative government contracts.14 By naming names, a 
business may prejudice its ability to obtain future contracts in 
that state.15 Further, organizations may worry that by coming 
clean they may reveal vulnerabilities and signal to copycats that 
they are an easy target.16 
A recent survey by ASIS International (“ASIS”), the largest 
global organization of security professionals, highlighted the 
problem: in many instances, businesses could not or would not, 
disclose how proprietary information theft occurred, by whom, or 
the value of the information stolen.17 Additionally, businesses 
may operate under the assumption that economic espionage is a 
low priority on law enforcement agencies’ to-do lists.18 This is not 
unwarranted given the historic reluctance to prosecute crimes for 
intellectual property (“IP”) theft,19 coupled with the fact that IP 
                                                          
 12. Sepura, supra note 5, at 137. 
 13. Chris Carr & Larry Gorman, The Revictimization of Companies by 
the Stock Market who Report Trade Secret Theft under the Economic 
Espionage Act, 57 BUS. LAW. 25, 30 (2001). 
 14. Schweizer, supra note 2, at 11. 
 15. INTERAGENCY OPSEC SUPPORT STAFF, IOSS INTELLIGENCE THREAT 
HANDBOOK: ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE 44 (2004), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/handbook/economic.pdf. 
 16. Sam Vaknin, The Industrious Spies, GLOBAL POLITICIAN, June 1, 
2006, 
http://www.globalpolitician.com/articledes.asp?ID=1824&cid=1&sid=27. 
 17. ASIS INT’L, supra note 9, at 11–13. 
 18. Robert C. Van Arnam, Business War: Economic Espionage in the 
United States and the European Union and the Need for Greater Trade 
Secret Protection, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L & COM. REG. 95, 99 (2001). 
 19. Throughout the 1970-80s, computer crimes were reluctantly 
prosecuted. The crimes’ complexity posed a steep learning curve for 
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theft is often extremely difficult to investigate.20 Businesses may 
pursue civil remedies in lieu of criminal action,21 though doing so 
becomes prohibitively difficult when the perpetrator is backed by a 
foreign state.22 
Up to seventy-five percent of an American business’s market 
value may be attributed to IP assets.23 These assets rarely 
undergo formal valuations and are not usually protected at a level 
that reflects their importance to the business.24 Significantly, a 
business may not be able to accurately estimate the damages 
caused by an intrusion for many months, or even years, down the 
line.25 It may not immediately realize its ever-dwindling market 
share is the direct result of a competitor successfully assimilating 
stolen information into its product.26 These factors indicate cost 
estimations are likely to be underrated. 
The attempts to estimate these costs have yielded staggering 
results. An ASIS survey released in 1998 estimated the cost to 
U.S. businesses at $250 billion per year.27 The losses have 
increased since the survey. Eighty-one percent  of respondents to 
an ASIS survey released in 2007 indicated that the cost impact of 
proprietary information theft was comparable or higher in 2005 
                                                          
prosecutors and made it difficult to persuade juries. Legislative action was 
not taken until large banks, investment houses, and other organizations 
began to suffer the effects of such crimes. See NOLAN, supra note 4, at 1. 
 20. Van Arnam, supra note 18, at 99. 
 21. Id. at 99. 
 22. Perpetrators of economic espionage may try to claim foreign 
sovereign immunity in relation to their activities. For a discussion on 
foreign sovereign immunity in relation to trade secret theft, see 
Christopher G. Blood, Holding Foreign Nations Civilly Accountable for their 
Economic Espionage Practices, 42 IDEA 227, 241–46 (2002). 
 23. ASIS INT’L, supra note 9, at 1. 
 24. Id. 
 25. ONCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1 n.3. 
 26. Id.; see also ASIS INT’L, supra note 9, at 40 (reporting that sixty 
percent of respondents to the most recent ASIS International survey 
indicated it would take less than twelve months for a competitor, having 
acquired stolen information, to assimilate it into a comparable product or 
service.  It is important to note that only 12 of 144 respondents answered 
with something other than “not available,” “not applicable,” or “unable to 
calculate.” It is possible the low response rate has to do with the difficulty 
in detecting economic espionage or a reluctance to admit to being 
victimized). 
 27. STEVEN FINK, STICKY FINGERS: MANAGING THE GLOBAL RISK OF 
ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE 193 (2003). 
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than in 2004 within their organizations.28 Furthermore, eighty-
eight percent of respondents indicated their information 
compromise attempts were higher in 2005 than in 2004.29 While 
approximately eighty-six percent of the world’s IP is generated in 
the United States, it only recognizes about fifty percent of the 
profit due to theft.30 
B. EFFECTS 
The effects of economic espionage are almost wholly negative. 
Economic espionage erodes the value of a target state’s assets.31 It 
may disrupt trade between target states and potential buyers.32 It 
discourages innovation.33 It may destroy a business’s hard-earned 
competitive advantage and stifle economic momentum.34 It may 
undermine current business plans, ruin profit projections,35 and 
“spell the difference between extinction and profitability.”36 
Research costs may have to be recouped by charging higher prices 
to customers.37 Businesses already undercut by lower overseas 
production costs may not be viable after factoring in the cost of 
these thefts. On a larger scale, economic espionage may have the 
long-term effect of weakening existing military alliances and trade 
coalitions.38 Economic espionage has been compared to warfare 
since both challenge the security and stability of sovereign 
nations.39 
                                                          
 28. ASIS INT’L, supra note 9, at 26. 
 29. Id. at 25. 
 30. WERT, supra note 3, at 2.  
 31. Susan W. Brenner & Anthony C. Crescenzi, State-Sponsored 
Crime: The Futility of the Economic Espionage Act, 28 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 389, 
448–49 (2006). 
 32. Schweizer, supra note 2, at 12. 
 33. Sepura, supra note 5, at 138. 
 34. ASIS INT’L, supra note 9, at 41. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Vaknin, supra note 16. 
 37. Thierry Olivier Desmet, The Economic Espionage Act 1996: Are We 
Finally Starting to Take Corporate Spies Seriously?, 22 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 93, 
95–96 (1999). 
 38. IOANNIS L. KONSTANTOPOULOS, RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN 
AND AMERICAN STUDIES, MACROECONOMIC ESPIONAGE: INCENTIVES AND 
DISINCENTIVES 20 (2006) (Greece), go to http://www.isn.ethz.ch/ search 
“Macroeconomic Espionage: Incentives and Disincentives” and click on 
the first link (speculating that traditional military alliances such as NATO 
will be harmed by economic espionage and dependence on trading blocs 
will increase in the future). 
 39. Brenner & Crescenzi, supra note 31, at 449. 
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C. PARTICIPANTS 
All states are motivated to spy on their “competition.”40 It 
would be irresponsible for a state to be unconcerned about its 
neighbor’s activities. However, since the end of the Cold War, 
traditional spying has become less important as states focus their 
efforts on building economic, not military, security.41 As economic 
security grows more important to national security, the interest in 
economic espionage becomes more significant.42 This trend is 
expected to continue.43 
Economic espionage is most prevalent in economically 
competitive countries.44 Thus, it is generally advanced Western 
states that bear the burden of economic espionage. As previously 
noted, the United States is a prime target.45 The most recent ASIS 
survey indicates that the top three foreign countries seeking to 
access U.S. information in 2005 were China, Russia, and India.46 
This balance is shifting. States previously uninterested in 
gathering economic information are fixing their sights on the 
United States. Entities from a record number of countries—108—
sought to retrieve sensitive or protected information between 
October 1, 2004 and September 30, 2005.47 Seventy percent of 
information compromises reported by those firms responding to 
the most recent ASIS survey were intended to benefit foreign 
individuals, firms, or governments.48 This figure only includes 
those incidents in which the recipient could be identified. In many 
instances, respondents were unable (or unwilling) to identify 
whether information was intended to benefit U.S. or foreign 
entities.49 Often, a conclusive link between a foreign government 
and the culprit cannot be established.50 Unsurprisingly, when a 
                                                          
 40. Van Arnam, supra note 18, at 98. 
 41. Schweizer, supra note 2, at 13. 
 42. Sepura, supra note 5, at 127–28. 
 43. ONCE REPORT, supra note 8, at v. 
 44. See Van Arnam, supra note 18, at 98. 
 45. Dominguez, supra note 7. 
 46. ASIS INT’L, supra note 9, at 3. 
 47. ONCE REPORT, supra note 8, at iii. 
 48. ASIS INT’L, supra note 9, at 23. Respondents reported that foreign 
individuals, firms, and governments were the beneficiaries of information 
compromises in 357 incidents, compared to 155 incidents where the 
primary beneficiary was a U.S. individual or firm. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. ONCE REPORT, supra note 8, at ix. 
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link was established, the perpetrators often had ethnic 
connections to the non-U.S. country benefiting from the 
compromise.51 
Perpetrators are becoming more skilled in disguising their 
intelligence operations.52 Traditional espionage efforts are 
becoming less common as governments have learned to glean 
intelligence from the private sector.53 Many governments establish 
organizations to track the activities of expatriates abroad in order 
to pump them for information upon their return home,54 which 
precludes the monitoring of meetings on American soil by U.S. 
officials.55 It is estimated that up to sixty percent of information 
collected by foreign intelligence agencies occurs on their own soil 
from foreign companies operating there.56 Authorities may 
                                                          
 51. ASIS INT’L, supra note 9, at 24. 
 52. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE SPYING GAME: TRICKS 
OF TODAY’S TRADE (2007), 
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/july07/spying070907.htm. A recent posting on 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s website describes common 
disguises, including: 
• Representatives at supposed “research institutes,” 
• Visiting business professionals and scientists who want to tour your 
state-of-the-art plants and operations worldwide (a great place to 
take pictures and make friends), 
• Tourists or visitors on non-immigrant visas, 
• Diplomatic officials, the standard cover, 
• False front companies, and 
• Students and educators. 
Id. 
The posting characterizes economic espionage as a state’s long-term 
commitment: 
•  “You hire a foreign-born engineer who has been educated in this 
country. Over a 10-15 year period, she rises to mid-level 
management. Then, she returns to her home country—where she 
gets paid by that government to set up a business that competes 
with yours.” 
• “A series of university students and professors from overseas take 
jobs in research labs on campus and get involved in related 
military projects. Individually, they learn only bits and pieces. 
But collectively, when they pass that information back to their 
home country, it paints a telling picture of our country’s defense 
initiatives.” 
Id. 
 53. ONCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6. 
 54. Id. at iv. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Levon Sevunts, A Spy in the Office, INFOSEC NEWS, Aug. 2, 2000, 
http://www.infosecnews.org/hypermail/0008/2532.html. 
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attempt to deal for information, or they may extract it through 
coercion in countries in which the private sector remains 
influenced by security services, such as Russia or China.57 The 
proliferation of foreign “front companies” in the United States is a 
concern.58 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) estimated 
in 2005 there were over 3000 such companies located in the 
United States designed to serve Chinese government interests.59 
Front companies are difficult to recognize. The number of valid 
commercial activities in which they participate makes it difficult to 
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate transactions.60 
The United States has been reluctant to publicly identify 
governments carrying out economic espionage campaigns, 
especially when the governments involved are considered allies.61 
The FBI, for instance, does not officially identify those states 
engaging in economic espionage against the United States.62 This 
reluctance reflects the fact that relations between governments 
take place on a number of levels concurrently.63 Publicly accusing 
                                                          
 57. ONCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6. An example of a government 
dealing for information allegedly occurred when an official French 
government program incentivized economic espionage by allowing its 
citizens to avoid mandatory military service by agreeing to work at U.S. 
high-tech companies, presumably to obtain trade secrets. See Craig L. 
Uhrich, The Economic Espionage Act—Reverse Engineering and the 
Intellectual Property Public Policy, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 147, 
148 (2001). 
An example of a government extracting information by coercion recently 
came to light at the Houston Offices of Shell Oil. A group of Chinese 
workers employed by Shell was caught stealing information to help China 
build oil infrastructure in Africa. China recently concluded agreements in 
the Darfur region of Sudan to develop such infrastructure. The 
perpetrators allege they have been threatened by the Chinese government 
that if they failed to obtain the information “things might not go well” for 
their relatives in China. See  Kelly O’Connell, Chinese Web Spies Steal 
Rolls Royce and Shell Oil Secrets, INTERNET BUS. L. SERVICES, Dec. 10, 
2007, 
http://www.ibls.com/internet_law_news_portal_view.aspx?s=latestnews&i
d=1927. 
 58. ASIS INT’L, supra note 9, at 19–20. 
 59. Id. at 20. 
 60. ONCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 7. 
 61. Brenner & Crescenzi, supra note 31, at 399. 
 62. Hedieh Nasheri & Timothy J. O’Hearn, High-tech Crimes and the 
American Economic Machine, 13 INT’L REV. L., COMPUTERS & TECH., 7, 12 
(1999). 
 63. Brenner & Crescenzi, supra note 31, at 399. 
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an ally of theft may heighten tensions between countries.64 
D. U.S. PARTICIPATION 
The United States has steadfastly denied engaging in 
economic espionage; it claims to react to instances of economic 
espionage in a purely defensive fashion.65 It is unlikely that the 
United States is merely a victim of economic espionage, as it, too, 
has been accused of such behavior. American officials have been 
expelled from both France and Germany following accusations of 
economic espionage.66 Recently, it has been accused of using its 
“Echelon” surveillance system to monitor the conversations of 
European Union (“EU”) companies67 and also to eavesdrop on 
conversations between the Indonesian government and Japanese 
manufacturers in order to get a piece of a $200 million satellite 
contract.68 EU nations have expressed concern that a U.S. 
program instituted post-September 11, 2001, allowing the United 
States to inspect international bank transfers taking place in the 
EU, is being used for economic espionage.69 The growing size of 
Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) stations located within the EU 
is a source of anxiety for some.70 
These quarrels have not resulted in a lasting political rift for 
the United States.71 However, feelings of suspicion and contempt 
for such alleged dishonesty doubtlessly linger.72 It remains to be 
seen whether a “dual-track” approach73—the overlooking of 
                                                          
 64. Id. 
 65. See Duncan L. Clarke & Robert Johnston, Economic Espionage 
and Interallied Strategic Cooperation, 40 THUNDERBIRD INT’L BUS. REV. 413, 
423 (1998) (quoting former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey 
stating the CIA “is not in the business of . . . spying on foreign 
corporations for the benefit of domestic businesses”). 
 66. Alan Cowell, Bonn Said to Expel U.S. Envoy Accused of Economic 
Spying, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 1997, at A6. 
 67. Peter Goodspeed, The New Space Invaders: Spies in the Sky, NAT’L 
POST (Canada), Feb. 19, 2000, at B.1. 
 68. Vaknin, supra note 16. 
 69. Resolution on the Interception of Bank Transfer Data from the 
SWIFT System by the US Secret Services, EUR. PARL. DOC. (C 303) (2006). 
Such transfers may potentially indicate prices, supply, and consumer 
information—a concern to EU businesses. 
 70. Clarke & Johnston, supra note 65, at 424. 
 71. Id. at 428. 
 72. Cowell, supra note 66. The article quotes an unidentified German 
intelligence official lamenting that the U.S. looks upon Berlin as “their 
backyard where they can do anything they like.” Id. 
 73. Clarke & Johnston, supra note 65, at 420. 
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economic espionage while remaining vigilant against military 
espionage—will be able to withstand public scrutiny.74 United 
States participation in economic espionage risks retaliation from 
targeted countries, decreased credibility when promoting 
international agreements, and diminished respect for its IP.75 
Most U.S. officials recognize these costs outweigh the benefits of 
the activities.76 To its credit, the United States does not appear to 
pass on information gathered from its activities to domestic 
businesses.77 
E. INTERNATIONAL ATTITUDES 
Cases of economic espionage rarely make the news. Amongst 
the general public there exists the perception that economic 
espionage is not a pressing problem, but rather an inevitable 
consequence of globalization.78 Internationally, there is a 
conspicuous lack of concern toward the practice.79 No 
                                                          
 74. Id. at 424. 
 75. Van Arnam, supra note 18, at 132. 
 76. Clarke & Johnston, supra note 65, at 423. 
 77. Schweizer, supra note 2, at 11. The author remarks the United 
States’ alleged activities constitute economic espionage “at its most benign 
level” and asserts it is the passing on of information to domestic 
companies that harms the global marketplace. Id.; see Brandon J. 
Witkow, Comment, A New “Spook Immunity”: How the CIA and American 
Business are Shielded from Liability for the Misappropriation of Trade 
Secrets, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 451, 460 (2000) (“[T]here is a fine line 
between the collection, through open sources of information, of economic 
trends for policy-making purposes and the covert theft of proprietary 
business information for dissemination to competing American 
corporations.”). Even those who believe U.S. law permits the collection of 
economic intelligence concede the passing on of such intelligence to 
domestic businesses is likely impermissible. Witkow, supra 77, at 482. 
 78. For example, in response to a recent blog posting describing how 
foreign citizens infiltrate U.S. companies to acquire information useful to 
their competition abroad, an individual remarked in response, “[s]ounds 
like global free enterprise to me.” Posting of Luke O’Brien to Wired Blog 
network, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/07/fbi-warns-of-
sp.html#previouspost (July 9, 2007, 4:00:50 PM). 
 79. Blood, supra note 22, at 233 (“[T]here appears to be little 
international will to recognize and address the problem of trade secret 
theft.”). Former Director of Central Intelligence Dr. John M. Deutch 
believes the adverse effects of economic espionage to U.S. companies are 
far less significant than those resulting from violations of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act. Q&A Following Worldwide Threat Assessment Brief, 
Before the S. Comm.on Government Affairs, 104th Cong. 26 (1996) 
(statement of John M. Deutch, Director of Central Intelligence), available 
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international agreement expressly prohibits it. This may be due to 
the fact that all states have an interest in conducting such 
activities.80 It is generally accepted that states spy on one another 
to some degree.81 In fact, many governments targeting the 
United States remain political or military allies.82 These 
states do not see a “contradiction in maintaining a military 
alliance with the United States while at the same time using 
their intelligence services to target U.S. technologies.”83 In a 
1991 interview, Pierre Marion, former head of the French 
spy agency Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure 
(“DGSE”), acknowledged this dichotomy, stating that “[i]t 
would not be normal that we do spy on the (United) States in 
political matters; we are really allied. But in the economic 
competition, in the technological competition, we are competitors; 
we are not allied.”84 
It is disputed whether economic espionage violates 
international law at all.85 An accepted way of determining the 
international legality of an act is to examine the general and 
consistent practice of states.86 Those actions consistently 
                                                          
at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1996/q-a-
following-worldwide-threat-assessment-brief.html. The effects of economic 
espionage and FCPA violations are strikingly similar: both distort trade, 
undermine economic development, misdirect resources from more 
valuable uses, and confer benefits on undeserving parties. OCED 
Fighting, infra note 213. 
 80. Commander Roger D. Scott, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence 
Collection and International Law, 46 A.F. L. REV. 217, 220 (1999). 
 81. Brenner & Crescenzi, supra note 31, at 400. 
 82. H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 5 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4024. “Unlike most espionage directed at military 
targets, economic espionage is as likely to be carried out by an ally as it is 
an adversary. The top twelve states placing economic spies in the United 
States are China, Canada, France, India, Japan, Germany, South Korea, 
Russia, Tawain, Great Britain, Israel, and Mexico.” GLENN P. HASTEDT, 
ESPIONAGE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 60 (2003). A brazen example 
occurred when the French intelligence agency, DGSE, placed audio 
equipment in the business class of Air France flights between Paris and 
New York to eavesdrop on travelling U.S. businessmen. Jeff Augustini, 
Note, From Goldfinger to Butterfinger: The Legal and Policy Issues 
Surrounding Proposals to Use the CIA for Economic Espionage, 26 LAW & 
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 459, 479 (1995). 
 83. H.R. REP. NO. 104-788 (1996), at 5, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4021, 4024. 
 84. Merrill E. Whitney & James D. Gaisford, Economic Espionage as 
Strategic Trade Policy, 29 CAN. J. ECON. 627, 627 (1996). 
 85. Blood, supra note 22, at 233. 
 86. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW  § 102(2) 
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practiced may become customary international law, either 
through explicit or tacit approval. By this measure, economic 
espionage may be tolerable under international law because many 
countries consistently practice it.87 Others resist the classification 
of spying as a permissible activity under international law. 
Instead, it is alleged that spying is a “consistently practiced illegal 
activity.”88 
The domestic laws of many states, including the United 
States, do not prohibit the intrusion into foreign territories for the 
purpose of collecting economic intelligence.89 U.S. law may in fact 
affirmatively support such activity.90 Therefore, any inclination to 
adopt a “holier than thou” attitude towards another state’s 
economic espionage practices may be perceived as hypocritical.91 
The “dual-track” notion helps explain why the United States has 
been reluctant to publicly accuse some of its traditional allies of 
information theft. 
Economic espionage is perceived by offending states as a 
lesser offense than political espionage.92 Many states consider the 
practice vital to their continued stability and success—to these 
states, economic spying is a matter of national security.93 Further, 
the business ethics of developing states are often fundamentally 
different than those in the Western world. Western business 
ethics have formed primarily in response to legal considerations.94 
For instance, U.S. business ethics have been shaped by legislation 
such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines.95  Alternatively, Chinese business ethics 
                                                          
(1987). 
 87. Blood, supra note 22, at 235. 
 88. Scott, supra note 80, at 222. 
 89. Blood, supra note 22, at 233. 
 90. Scott, supra note 80, at 217. The question of whether the National 
Security Act of 1947 authorizes U.S. intelligence agencies to conduct 
economic espionage, to a limited extent, has been answered in the 
affirmative by at least one commentator. Witkow, supra note 77, at 459–
60. 
 91. Brenner & Crescenzi, supra note 31, at 400. 
 92. Blood, supra note 22, at 246. 
 93. WERT, supra note 3, at 4. 
 94. Kristen Day, Chinese Perceptions of Business Ethics, 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS INSTITUTE, http://www.business-
ethics.org/iberpubback.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) (link no longer 
functioning). 
 95. Id. 
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are rooted in a Confucian heritage.96 Personal relationships, 
loyalty, and trust are often afforded greater significance than legal 
considerations.97 The mind-set of developing states may be that 
ethics are a subordinate concern that should not be addressed 
until productive forces are maximized.98 Finally, the significance 
of IP protection is not a universal value. Many states have been 
historically reluctant to protect IP and remain so.99 For example, 
the inclusion of trade secrets in the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) was staunchly 
opposed by developing states and was viewed as a concession to 
Western business interests.100 States with minimal respect for IP 
impose their values on the developed world through the theft of 
such materials. 
II. EXISTING LEGISLATION AND AGREEMENTS 
TARGETING ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE 
A. THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1996 
Recognizing the damage that economic espionage was 
causing U.S. businesses, Congress passed the Economic 
Espionage Act, which became effective October 11, 1996.101 Prior 
to its creation there was no federal statute that directly dealt with 
economic espionage.102 
The Act criminalizes the copying or controlling of trade 
secrets with the intent to (1) benefit a foreign government, 
instrumentality, or agent,103 or (2) with the intent to convert a 
trade secret for the economic benefit of a person other than the 
                                                          
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Sepura, supra note 5, at 141. 
 100. Robin J. Effron, Note, Secrets and Spies: Extraterritorial 
Application of the Economic Espionage Act and the TRIPS Agreement, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475, 1511 (2003). 
 101. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2000). American business lobbied 
vigorously for the creation of the Economic Espionage Act. IBM spent 
almost $2.7 million in the first six months of 1996 on such lobbying 
efforts. NOLAN, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
 102. Prior to the enactment of the Economic Espionage Act, the 
government principally relied upon mail fraud or fraud by wire statutes. 
The usefulness of these statutes was limited. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, 
at 6 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4025. The Act is 
codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839. 
 103. 18 U.S.C. § 1831. 
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rightful owner.104 The first section, § 1831, prohibits economic 
espionage, while the second, § 1832, prohibits industrial 
espionage.105 A “trade secret” is generally defined as business 
information which the owner has taken “reasonable measures” to 
keep secret and is not “generally known” or “readily ascertainable” 
to the general public through proper means.106 Individuals found 
in violation of § 1831 are subject to maximum penalties of fifteen 
years in prison and fines up to $500,000.107 Any organization that 
violates § 1831 is subject to a maximum fine of $10,000,000.108 
Further, the Act prescribes mandatory forfeiture of the fruits of 
the offense109 and any property used to facilitate the offense110 to 
the U.S. Government. The Act applies to conduct occurring 
outside the United States, but only in limited circumstances. The 
offender must be a citizen of the United States or an organization 
organized under U.S. laws, or an act in furtherance of the offense 
must be committed in the United States.111 
Complaints that the Act’s inherent limitations decrease its 
effectiveness have arisen.112 Its language has been criticized as 
vague and difficult to interpret.113 While the Act authorizes the 
U.S. Attorney General to obtain appropriate injunctive relief for 
                                                          
 104. 18 U.S.C. § 1832. 
 105. The difference between “economic espionage” and “industrial 
espionage” turns on the lack of state involvement in industrial espionage 
activities. Industrial espionage typically takes place between private, non-
government competitors looking to gain competitive advantage in the 
marketplace. 
 106. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A)-(B). 
 107. 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a). 
 108. 18 U.S.C. § 1831(b). 
 109. 18 U.S.C. § 1834(a)(1). 
 110. 18 U.S.C. § 1834(a)(2). 
 111. 18 U.S.C. § 1837(1)-(2). 
 112. See, e.g., Sepura, supra note 5, at 140. 
 113. Van Arnam, supra note 18, at 116. See also Clarke & Johnston, 
supra note 65, at 428, where they highlight the following issue: 
[T]he statute defines trade secrets as information the “owner” has 
taken “reasonable measures” to keep secret. Who is the owner in 
a joint venture with a foreign partner? What constitutes 
reasonable measures to maintain secure facilities during site 
visits by foreign visitors? American companies must also 
determine whether their foreign national employees can be 
classified as “foreign agents” in the employ of a “foreign 
instrumentality”, and, as such, whether they should handle trade 
secrets. 
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any violation of the Section,114 it does not prescribe a private right 
of action for either damages or injunctive relief.115 In 2002 the 
Attorney General elected to renew a requirement obligating 
prosecutors to seek the approval of the Attorney General before 
commencing a prosecution under § 1831.116 Accordingly, “only 
the most egregious, clear-cut, or high-profile instances” are 
prosecuted.117 The manner with which FBI and federal 
prosecutors have handled businesses’ trade secrets has been 
concerning.118 Businesses are reluctant to divulge trade secrets in 
court while prosecuting alleged offenders.119 Prosecution may be 
counterproductive if it requires disclosure of the information 
sought.120 Few cases involving economic espionage have been 
brought to trial, representing only a fraction of the many thought 
to exist.121 Frequently, it is difficult to demonstrate a connection 
                                                          
 114. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(a). 
 115. See Boyd v. University of Illinois, No. 96-9327, 1999 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15438, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1999) (holding the EEA affords no 
standing to private citizens); Brown v. Citicorp, No. 97-6337, 1998 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 9273, at *9 n.3 (E.D. Ill. June 17, 1998) (holding the EEA 
does not allow civil actions to be brought by private citizens). 
 116. Memorandum from the Attorney General on Renewal of Approval 
Requirement Under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (Mar. 1, 2002), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/eea1996.pdf. 
 117. A. HUGH SCOTT, COMPUTER AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIME 212 
(2001); see also Randall W. Schwartz, Comment, Are Corporate 
Information Assets, in the Midst of Dynamic Technological and 
Infrastructural Advances, Best Secured by Legal or Self-Help Remedies?, 26 
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 163, 183 (2003). 
 118. See generally MacLean, supra note 11. 
 119. Van Arnam, supra note 18, at 115; see also MacLean, supra note 
11, (quoting Steven Fink of Lexicon Communications Corp., that 
companies “feel they are more at risk for getting trade secrets exposed by 
coming forward than just sweeping it under the rug”). 
 120. Gary E. Weiss & K. Alexandra McClure, Trade Secret Prosecution 
Risks Further Losses of IP, NAT’L L.J., June 21, 1999, at C6. The article 
describes methods which federal prosecutors use to ease business’s 
concerns about trade secret disclosure during trial. Methods include the 
use of protective orders during pre-trial proceedings, seeking temporary 
courtroom closures, placing documents under seal at the conclusion of 
trial, or prohibiting jurors from seeing certain exhibits or requiring them 
to not to disclose information learned during the trial. The article notes 
that obtaining these orders can be difficult in a criminal trial due to the 
defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to due process of law. Id. 
 121. Sepura, supra note 5, at 139–40. As of the time of writing, only 
three cases prosecuted have alleged economic espionage under § 1831 of 
the Act. See Press Release, Department of Justice, Chinese National 
Sentenced for Committing Economic Espionage with the Intent to Benefit 
China Navy Research Center (June 18, 2008), 
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between the perpetrator and the state suspected of directing the 
individual’s activities.122 Even when a connection is established, 
states have been reluctant to extradite citizens accused of 
economic espionage to face prosecution.123 Because the Act does 
not prescribe any sanctions against a government found to have 
directed the activities, there is little reason to comply with an 
extradition request. Further, the Act is criticized for being 
ineffective against those sheltered by diplomatic immunity.124 All 
things considered, while the Act may be useful to deter some 
forms of espionage, its value as a deterrent to state-sponsored 
espionage is limited.125 
B. PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL 
PROPERTY 
The Paris Convention126 (the “Convention”) was the first 
                                                          
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/mengSent.pdf. 
 122. MacLean, supra note 11. 
 123. Brenner & Crescenzi, supra note 31, at 438; see, e.g., 
Press Release, Department of Justice, First Foreign Economic Espionage 
Indictment; Defendants Steal Trade Secrets from Cleveland Clinic 
Foundation (May 8, 2001), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/Okamoto_SerizawaIndict.htm
. 
Okamato was charged under § 1831 of the Economic Espionage Act for 
the theft of several hundred vials containing DNA and cell reagents from a 
U.S. research laboratory, Cleveland Clinic Foundation, where he was 
employed. Okamoto was simultaneously in the employ of a Japanese 
research institute, RIKEN. A Tokyo High Court refused extradition, 
concluding there was no conclusive evidence he had violated the 
Economic Espionage Act. Court rejects U.S. request for extradition in 
industrial spy case, Okamoto’s genetic materials didn’t benefit Riken: 
judge, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, Mar. 30, 2004, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20040330a1.html. 
 124. Schwartz, supra note 117, at 183. Those with diplomatic status 
are often involved in the collection of economic information: 
An espionage relationship can start as simple friendship with 
someone who is actually an intelligence officer for an embassy 
whose goal is to recruit government or corporate insider(s) with 
access, knowledge and willingness to give information. The 
intelligence officer may cultivate the person for years, develop a 
relationship, start by asking for innocent information, e.g. an 
annual report, get to know the person’s motivations and use them 
to get more information[.] 
WERT, supra note 3, at 3. 
 125. Clarke & Johnston, supra note 65, at 429. 
 126. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
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international agreement to protect IP.127 It specifically focuses on 
industrial property.128 The Convention requires that signatories 
provide the same IP rights to foreign nationals as those provided 
to their own citizens.129 It was designed with flexibility in mind—
signatories are afforded a level of discretion about how they must 
implement the Convention into their domestic law.130 This 
flexibility has been criticized for “perpetuating weak national 
laws.”131 Further, economic espionage is not specifically 
addressed by the Convention. Article 10bis states “[a]ny act of 
competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or 
commercial matters constitutes an act of unfair competition.”132 
Regrettably, the Convention does not clarify whether proprietary 
information theft would contravene this provision. The Convention 
is now over 100 years old and this provision has not proven useful 
in limiting economic espionage. 
C. AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS (TRIPS) 
TRIPS establishes comprehensive minimum standards for the 
protection of IP.133 It is administered by the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) and was adopted during the Uruguay Round 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) in 1994. 
Article 39 grants perpetual trade secret protection, provided the 
secret is not “generally known or readily accessible” to the general 
public,134 the secret has “commercial value because it is a 
secret,”135 and the person controlling the secret has taken 
reasonable steps to prevent its disclosure.136 Article 39(1) requires 
signatories to protect confidential information submitted to 
governments or governmental agencies.137 This prevents foreign 
states from examining government records in the hope of finding 
                                                          
 127. Van Arnam, supra note 18, at 118. 
 128. Paris Convention, supra note 126, art. 1. 
 129. Id. at art. 2. 
 130. Van Arnam, supra note 18, at 118. 
 131. Schwartz, supra note 117, at 184. 
 132. Paris Convention, supra note 126, art. 10bis. 
 133. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, art. 1(1), Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M 81 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 134. TRIPS, supra note 133, art. 39(2). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. TRIPS, supra note 133, art. 39(1). 
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useful information.138 
TRIPS does not specifically address economic espionage. The 
fact that proprietary information theft is not among its 
enumerated activities “contrary to honest commercial practices” 
may imply trade secret protection is an ancillary concern in 
TRIPS’ overall IP protection scheme.139 Further, Article 8(1) of the 
Agreement provides a broad exception that allows governments to 
adopt contrary national laws “to promote the public interest in 
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development.”140 This permits states to avoid 
prohibitions against economic espionage that are not forbidden by 
the agreement in specific terms.141 
D. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA) 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) 
operates between the United States, Canada, and Mexico142 and 
entered into effect on January 1, 1994.143 The treaty is the first 
international agreement to provide explicit protection for trade 
secrets.144 The IP protections afforded under NAFTA generally 
reflect those in TRIPS, except that NAFTA defines “commercial 
value” in a manner protecting information with future or potential 
commercial value in addition to information with existing value. 
145 Under NAFTA, a misappropriation of proprietary information is 
not actionable unless the acquiring party knew, or was grossly 
negligent in failing to know, its actions were illegal.146 This is a 
higher standard than is required under U.S. tort law, which only 
requires one to prove an infringer’s actual or constructive 
knowledge.147 While NAFTA remains an important benchmark in 
international IP protection, it is operative, obviously, only between 
                                                          
 138. HEDIEH NASHERI, ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND INDUSTRIAL SPYING 127 
(2005). Although the specific reference is to NAFTA, the same logic applies 
to TRIPS. 
 139. Blood, supra note 22, at 235. 
 140. TRIPS, supra note 133, art. 8(1). 
 141. Van Arnam, supra note 18, at 120. 
 142. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 
1992, 32 I.L.M. 612 [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 143. NASHERI, supra note 138, at 127. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See NAFTA, supra note 142, art.1711. 
 146. NASHERI, supra note 138, at 127. 
 147. Van Arnam, supra note 18, at 121. 
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its signatories. Further, concerns have been raised about Mexico’s 
ability to adequately fund and prosecute IP violations.148 
E. U.N. RESOLUTIONS 1236 AND 2131 
There are two U.N. resolutions that may indirectly address 
economic espionage. Resolution 1236, “Peaceful and neighbourly 
relations among States,” calls upon states to develop friendly and 
cooperative relations and mutually respect one another’s 
sovereignty.149 Resolution 2131, “Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States 
and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty,” states 
“[n]o State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any 
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other 
State.”150 Further, it condemns the “interference . . . against the 
personality of the State or against its political, economic and 
cultural elements.”151 
On the surface, it would appear that both of these resolutions 
could be construed to prohibit economic espionage. However, 
resolutions of this kind are persuasive—not binding—resources 
that tend to be ignored by states.152 They are not a manageable 
standard against which acceptable or unacceptable intelligence 
practices may be measured.153 Finally, a number of states feel 
that Resolution 2131 conveys a political, rather than legal, 
view.154 Consequently, general political pressure may be the only 
recourse in terms of enforcement.155 
F. OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 
Bribing government officials or employees is a common way to 
                                                          
 148. Neil Jetter, Comment, NAFTA: The Best Friend of an Intellectual 
Property Right Holder Can Become Better, 9 FLA. J. INT’L L. 331, 339–40 
(1994). 
 149. Peaceful and neighbourly relations among States, G.A. Res. 1236 
(XII) U.N. Doc. A/RES/12/1236 (Dec. 14,  1957). 
 150. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic 
Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and 
Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131 (XX) Declaration 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/20/2131 (21 Dec. 1965). 
 151. Id. 
 152. NASHERI, supra note 138, at 127–28. 
 153. Sepura, supra note 5, at 145. 
 154. Id. 
 155. NASHERI, supra note 138, at 177. 
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conduct economic espionage.156 The OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials (the “OECD 
Convention”),157 effective since 1999,158 has served as a minor 
setback for those seeking to engage in economic espionage. First, 
many instances of economic espionage do not involve bribery. 
Second, the OECD Convention only prohibits the bribery of 
government officials159—in many instances, bribes may be paid to 
individuals with no government affiliation. Finally, the OECD 
Convention has been ratified by only thirty-seven countries.160 In 
many states there remain no laws prohibiting the bribery of 
foreign government officials.161 
III. PROPOSED METHODS OF TARGETING ECONOMIC 
ESPIONAGE 
A. IMPROVING CORPORATE SECURITY 
Encouraging businesses to enhance corporate security 
targets the “supply side” of economic espionage.162 Businesses are 
expected to protect their valuable assets to the utmost degree. 
Standard measures include the use of nondisclosure agreements, 
employee education and training, restrictive access controls, 
computer security, document creation/retention/destruction 
policies, and explicit markings of confidentiality on critical 
documents.163 Businesses are encouraged to develop their 
                                                          
 156. Id. at 128. 
 157. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf. 
 158. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention: Entry into Force of the Convention, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3343,en_2649_34859_2057484_1_
1_1_1,00.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2009). 
 159. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, supra note 157, art. 3(1). 
 160. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, supra 
note 158. 
 161. A. John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and 
International Law, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 595, 620 (2007) (noting that many 
other states do not have statutes like the Foreign Corrupts Practices Act). 
 162. Marc A. Moyer, Comment, Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988: A Formidable Weapon in the War Against 
Economic Espionage, 15 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 178, 179 (1994). 
 163. DAVE DRAB, XEROX CORP., PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW: 
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investigative competencies and direct resources toward 
“identifying and mitigating” insider threats, such as dishonest 
employees.164 Developing these skills is costly and the effects are 
frequently “messy.”165 Businesses may attempt to moderate their 
exposure to risk through their contracts entered into with other 
entities.166 When working in other countries, a business should 
try to align its economic interests with those with whom they work 
so that information theft is equally damaging to each party.167 
However, these strategies are almost futile against state-
sponsored economic espionage. No business has the resources to 
compete with a state determined to acquire its secrets.168 
B. COUNTER-ESPIONAGE 
Some consider retaliation in kind the most appropriate 
response to economic espionage.169 Former CIA Director under 
President Carter, Stansfield Turner, proposed that the United 
States imitate other states, such as France,170 by establishing an 
offensive economic espionage program.171 Advocates reason a tit-
for-tat response is appropriate and may in fact be mutually 
productive.172 They indicate that foreigners already spy on U.S. 
businesses and the only real concern is the risk of further 
retaliation by “spying even more.”173 Ultimately, these proponents 
                                                          
UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1996 at 8 (2003), 
http://www.xerox.com/downloads/wpaper/x/xgs_white_paper_drab.pdf. 
 164. ASIS INT’L, supra note 9, at 13. 
 165. WERT, supra note 3, at 2. 
 166. Problems typically arise through sub-contracting or outsourcing 
arrangements. Exposure to critical technologies should be minimized in 
these instances. See ASIS INT’L, supra note 9, at 33. 
 167. WERT, supra note 3, at 4. 
 168. 142 CONG. REC. S12, 211 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kohl). 
 169. Schweizer, supra note 2, at 14. 
 170. France developed its Ecole de Guerre Economique (EGE)—the 
“School of Economic Warfare”—in 1996. Allegedly, EGE “trains students 
to target U.S. technology and information.” EGE’s founder insists the 
school teaches methods of collecting economic intelligence which do not 
include the sort of espionage engaged in by the French DGSE. 
Communication Security Inc., Tilting the Playing Field: Economic 
Espionage Hasn’t Gone Away Since 9/11, at 4 (Jan. 28, 2005), 
http://www.bugsweep.com/articles/jinsa-espionage.html. 
 171. Augustini, supra note 82, at 484. 
 172. Id. at 490 (“[F]oreign companies should be as vulnerable to 
penetration by U.S. intelligence as U.S. companies currently are to foreign 
intelligence. Mutual mistrust in this sense might be productive for all 
involved.”). 
 173. Id. at 489–90. 
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believe the fear of reprisals in the form of U.S. spying will “level 
the playing field” for U.S. businesses more than legislation ever 
could.174 
These notions have not had the requisite support from either 
corporate America or the intelligence community to come to 
fruition.175 Former CIA Director Woolsey’s predecessor, Robert M. 
Gates, referred to the plan as a “moral and legal swamp.”176 
Opponents are concerned  that victimized states will retaliate 
against U.S. businesses.177 Such activities may damage “special 
relationships” with allies and harm valuable business 
associations.178 There are difficulties in determining which 
companies are “domestic” and “foreign” in our increasingly 
interconnected world.179 The arms-length relationship between 
firms and government in some countries, including the United 
States, may pose difficulties.180 Once gathered, the allocation of 
information presents a problem—how is it to be distributed 
amongst competitors?181 Who gets to “claim the prize”?182 Such 
arrangements could cause relations between U.S. businesses to 
deteriorate to a point where fewer joint ventures are undertaken, 
ultimately decreasing U.S. competitiveness worldwide.183 The 
biggest hurdle to such a plan may be the U.S. business ethic—
Americans hold deep-seated moral views on how business is to be 
conducted.184 Theft and deception likely conflict with these views. 
Ultimately, an offensive economic espionage plan would damage 
the credibility of the anti-economic espionage measures already in 
place and mark a reversal of U.S. policies up to this point in 
time.185 
                                                          
 174. Id. at 491. 
 175. Schweizer, supra note 2, at 14. 
 176. William T. Warner, Economic Espionage: A Bad Idea, NAT’L L.J., 
Apr. 12, 1993, at 13. 
 177. Augustini, supra note 82, at 489. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Warner, supra note 176, at 13. 
 180. Whitney & Gaisford, supra note 84, at 628. 
 181. Warner, supra note 176, at 13. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Witkow, supra note 77, at 466–67. 
 184. Augustini, supra note 82, at 488. 
 185. Warner, supra note 176, at 13. 
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C. UNILATERAL SANCTIONS 
Unilateral sanctions have been proposed to address economic 
espionage.186 Unilateral sanctions are most effective when 
imposed by a powerful state, such as the United States.187 
Powerful states usually possess the resources or other advantages 
which permit them to mitigate the costs of imposing sanctions 
and overcome collective action problems.188 However, unilateral 
sanctions are often difficult to impose, even for the most powerful 
states.189 As previously noted, relations between states may occur 
on different levels simultaneously,190 making the issuance of such 
sanctions implausible due to geostrategic or political factors.191 
When imposed against international opposition, sanctions may 
damage important bilateral relationships and have the ironic 
effect of boosting the targeted state’s international standing.192 
The imposition of unilateral sanctions often harms the 
sanctioning state more than the intended target193—punishing 
U.S. workers, suppliers, and shareholders.194 The United States 
dominates few industries in the global market.195 Targeted states 
are free to turn to foreign suppliers to replace the goods previously 
supplied by American companies.196 The habitual use of 
unilateral economic sanctions causes U.S. businesses to be 
viewed as unreliable suppliers and harms long-term commercial 
                                                          
 186. See, e.g., Moyer, supra note 162. But note that the article was 
written prior to the enactment of the Economic Espionage Act. Further, 
Moyer merely advocated using Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988 as an interim measure until more 
appropriate measures were devised. 
 187. Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1619 
(2005). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 1621. 
 190. Brenner & Crescenzi, supra note 31, at 399. 
 191. Helfer, supra note 187, at 1620. 
 192. Adam Smith, A High Price to Pay: The Costs of the U.S. Economic 
Sanctions Policy and the Need for Process Oriented Reform, 4 UCLA J. INT’L 
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 325, 370 (1999-2000). 
 193. Daniel T. Griswold, Going Alone on Economic Sanctions Hurts U.S. 
More than Foes, CATO CENTER FOR TRADE POLICY STUDIES, Nov. 27, 2000, 
http://www.freetrade.org/node/216/print. 
 194. Harry Wolff, Unilateral Economic Sanctions: Necessary Foreign 
Policy Tool or Ineffective Hindrance on American Businesses?, 6 HOUS. BUS. 
& TAX L.J. 329, 362 (2006). 
 195. Id. at 361. 
 196. Id. 
DANIELSON MEA.  Economic Espionage: A Framework for a Workable Solution.  MINN. 
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2009;10(2): 503-548. 
526 MINN J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 10:2 
 
 
relations,197 leading to residual losses from forfeited maintenance 
and replacement contracts.198 These factors have caused most 
researchers to conclude that unilateral sanctions are ill-advised199 
and must satisfy strict conditions if utilized.200 
D. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS 
Some propose bilateral agreements to address economic 
espionage.201 Bilateral agreements are advantageous because they 
may be negotiated more rapidly than multilateral agreements and 
greater levels of protection are frequently achieved.202 However, 
bilateral negotiations are difficult in the economic espionage 
context. Approaching states individually may have grave 
diplomatic consequences. A United States approach to China, for 
                                                          
 197. Smith, supra note 192, at 340. The experiences of Caterpillar 
Tractor during the U.S. embargo of the Soviet Union illustrates this 
problem. Caterpillar was once the undisputed industry leader in heavy-
construction equipment. In 1982 Caterpillar lost a $90 million pipe-laying 
contract after the U.S. declared sanctions in response to the Soviet 
declaration of martial law in Poland. The Soviets came to view Caterpillar 
as an erratic supplier. Japanese heavy equipment manufacturer Komatsu 
filled the vacancy left by Caterpillar and was able to “take over a new 
market without facing competition, and then leverage that monopolistic 
market to compete more effectively against Caterpillar in other markets.” 
Peter S. Jordan, Country Sanctions and the International Business 
Community, 91 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 333, 338 (1997) (Remarks by R. 
Rennie Atterbury III); The Crunch at Caterpillar, TIME, Jul. 9, 1984, at 64, 
available at 
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,950102,00.html. 
 198. Wolff, supra note 194, at 362. 
 199. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 192, at 354; see also Jordan, supra 
note 197, at 336 (remarks of Barry E. Carter) (“Cutting off U.S. 
exports . . . would seem to be the economic sanction of last resort.”). 
 200. Craig Forcese, Globalizing Decency: Responsible Engagement in an 
Era of Economic Integration, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 19 
(“[S]anctions are most likely to be successful where the goal is relatively 
modest, the target is much smaller than the country applying the 
sanctions, there is substantial trade between the two nations, the 
sanctions are imposed rapidly and decisively, and the cost to the 
sanctioning country is low.”). 
 201. See, e.g., Dave McCurdy, Glasnost for the CIA, in AMERICAN 
DEFENSE POLICY 138, 140 (Peter L. Hays et al. eds., 1997); see also Melvin 
A. Goodman, The Market for Spies, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Winter 1996–
1997, at 95 (reviewing JOHN J. FIALKA, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: ECONOMIC 
ESPIONAGE (1997)). 
 202. Frank J. Garcia, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in the 
North American Free Trade Agreement: A Successful Case of Regional 
Trade Regulation, 8 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 817, 824 (1993). 
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instance, could be taken as a formal accusation of the Chinese 
government’s complicity in economic espionage efforts. Equally, it 
could be interpreted as an admission of guilt by the United States 
to intelligence-gathering in China. Tackling the problem through 
bilateral agreements could signal that economic espionage is, 
absent an agreement to the contrary, acceptable. The negotiation 
of a bilateral agreement could be prohibitively difficult. Bilateral 
agreements are unlikely to incorporate compliance-inducing 
mechanisms such as binding dispute resolution, monitoring 
procedures or provide for formal sanctions.203 Finally, the 
potential for reputational harm is a greater deterrent in a 
multilateral context. Generally, a state that breaks an agreement 
between itself and multiple other states faces greater reputational 
harm than a state that breaks a bilateral commitment. 
IV. A WORKABLE SOLUTION 
The concept of a convention prohibiting economic espionage 
has been discussed.204 Most debate occurred as the Economic 
Espionage Act came into effect in 1996. There existed “little 
international will” to deal with the problem of trade secret theft at 
the time.205 Some remarked that establishing a convention to deal 
with economic espionage would be difficult given “state 
involvement in that activity.”206 It was argued that detecting the 
surreptitious practice was not easy because of its passive nature, 
thus any prohibition would be difficult to enforce.207 Further, 
many felt U.S. businesses needed less regulation, not more.208 
                                                          
 203. Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 579, 605 (2005) (remarking that agreements with near-
universal membership, such as the WTO, are more likely to provide for 
compliance-inducing mechanisms). 
 204. See, e.g., McCurdy, supra note 201, at 140; Goodman, supra note 
201, at 93; Michael T. Clark, Comment, Economic Espionage: The Role of 
the United States Intelligence Community, 3 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 253, 288–
90 (1997); Todd A. Morth, Note, Considering Our Position: Viewing 
Information Warfare as a Use of Force Prohibited by Article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 567, 581 (1998) (stating any 
prohibition on economic espionage would not be respected by the 
international community). 
 205. Blood, supra note 22, at 233. 
 206. Brenner & Crescenzi, supra note 31, at 455. 
 207. Morth, supra note 204, at 581. 
 208. Elaine Waldron, Epidemic of Economic Espionage Takes Huge Toll 
on L.A. Companies, L.A. BUS. J., Mar. 11, 1996, 
http://www.allbusiness.com/north-america/united-states-california-
metro-areas/572231-1.html. 
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Businesses observed that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(“FCPA”) already placed U.S. businesses at a significant 
disadvantage compared to their foreign competitors.209 In much of 
the world, U.S. laws prohibiting the bribery of foreign government 
officials were seen as “quaint.”210 U.S. business craved a “leveling 
of the playing field” in relation to foreign competitors.211 
The climate has changed considerably since the concept was 
dismissed. Recent developments suggest an improved global 
commitment to promoting ethical business practices. The “leveling 
of the playing field” sought by U.S. businesses arrived in the form 
of the OECD Convention.212 U.S. anti-bribery laws once viewed as 
“quaint” have since become standard for thirty-eight countries 
that have implemented the OECD Convention in the form of 
domestic legislation. The OECD Convention has, for the most 
part, been successful in establishing an “anti-corruption culture” 
among members.213 Along similar lines, the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (the “U.N. Convention”) entered 
into force in 2005.214 Through its “four pillars” (prevention, 
criminalization, international cooperation, and asset recovery), the 
U.N. Convention strives to eliminate corruption in both the public 
and private sectors.215 Further still, the United Nations Global 
Compact (the “Compact”), announced in 2000216 and amended in 
                                                          
 209. Id. 
 210. Schweizer, supra note 2, at 12. 
 211. Waldron, supra note 208. 
 212. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,3343,en_2649_34859_2017813_1_
1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2009). 
 213. See Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Fighting Bribery and 
Corruption: Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_37447_35430226_1
_1_1_37447,00.html#how_works (last visited Feb. 10, 2008) [hereinafter 
OCED Fighting]; see also TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, PROGRESS REPORT 
07 at 4, 21 (2007), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/content/download/21619/314761/file/3rd
_OECD_progress_report_07.pdf. 
 214. Press Release, U.N. Information Services, United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption Enters Into Force on 14 December, U.N. 
Doc. CP/528 (Dec. 13, 2005), available at 
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2005/uniscp528.html. 
 215. Id. 
 216. UN Global Compact Office, UN Global Compact Annual Review 
2007 Leaders Summit 7 (July 5-6, 2007), available at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/GCAnnualRevie
DANIELSON MEA.  Economic Espionage: A Framework for a Workable Solution.  MINN. 
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2009;10(2): 503-548. 
2009] ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE 529 
2004,217 encourages businesses to conduct themselves in 
accordance with ten principles concerning human rights, labor, 
the environment, and corruption.218 The Compact is not 
regulatory in nature; instead it relies upon public accountability, 
transparency, and the self-interest of participants to achieve 
compliance.219 Among its many purposes, the Compact implores 
businesses to refrain from business practices which “discourage 
innovation and entrepreneurship”220—thus touching upon, 
tangentially, the practice of economic espionage. 
These developments have elevated the role of ethics in global 
business. They indicate a readiness among the public and private 
sector to abandon individually-profitable activities in recognition 
of their larger destructive effects. However, these developments 
only deal with economic espionage in a marginal sense. Economic 
espionage remains to be explicitly addressed by any international 
commitment. Incidents will rise until joint efforts are made to 
solve the problem.221 
Entrenching an agreement prohibiting economic espionage as 
a convention would subject its provisions to the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, obliging parties to comply as a 
matter of international law.222 Clarifying the status of economic 
espionage as an impermissible activity would ease management of 
the problem across different cultures.223 A convention would 
spread the economic224 and political225 costs of responding to 
                                                          
w2007.pdf. 
 217. Id. at 37. 
 218. Id. at 6. 
 219. Id. at 4. 
 220. Id. at 6. 
 221. NASHERI, supra note 138, at 172. 
 222. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, concluded 
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at http:// 
untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pd
f [hereinafter VCLT] (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties and 
must be performed by them in good faith”). The VCLT is seen as an 
authoritative statement of the customary international law of treaties, 
even by non-signatories. 
 223. Philip M. Nichols, The Myth of Anti-Bribery Laws as Transnational 
Intrusion, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 627, 642–43 (2000). 
 224. See Helfer, supra note 187, at 1616 (noting that an economic 
espionage convention would require financial contributions from members 
for expenditures such as support staff, facilities, and operations). 
Presumably, these costs would be lower in a multilateral context than if 
each state were to establish individual counter-espionage programs 
concentrating on economic espionage. 
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economic espionage amongst the membership base, making any 
response less costly for individual members. Further, a 
multilateral response would be more effective than one made 
unilaterally.226 A convention would encourage transparency and 
promote the Western business ethic by encouraging fair 
competition.227 Information sharing could lead to other 
cooperative opportunities, technical advances, and accelerate 
economic development.228 
V. CONVENTION FRAMEWORK 
Commentary on a convention prohibiting economic espionage 
has been scarce. The structure of such an agreement remains 
unaddressed. The remainder of this article deals with this issue 
and discusses the potential barriers to implementation the 
proposed convention would face. 
A. MONITORING PROCEDURES 
An economic espionage convention would require a 
monitoring procedure to ensure that parties face sanctions for 
their misbehavior. Monitoring would increase the information 
available to members, allowing them to better co-ordinate a 
response to an instance of economic espionage than in an 
information poor (i.e., convention-less) environment.229 To satisfy 
                                                          
 225. See, e.g., Wolff, supra note 194, at 361. An accusation of, or 
response to, economic espionage has certain implications. Unilateral 
responses typically cause resentment for the imposing state in the target 
state. A multilateral response decreases resentment toward particular 
states and is more likely to be viewed as legitimate by the international 
community. 
 226. Jordan, supra note 197, at 339 (remarks by R. Rennie Atterbury 
III); see also Smith, supra note 192, at 370 (“Sanctions are most effective 
and least costly when they have broad support from the international 
community.”). 
 227. See, e.g., McCurdy, supra note 201, at 139 (warning that if the 
“world’s major trading powers begin viewing each other with suspicion, 
hoarding economic breakthroughs like atomic secrets and monitoring 
each other like enemies, the world could easily slide into an economic 
version of the Cold War”). 
 228. Id. at 140. 
 229. See Julian Oullet, Monitoring of Agreements, BEYOND 
INTRACTABILITY, Nov. 2003, 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/monitoring_agreements 
(explaining the use of monitoring to ensure enforcement of international 
agreements). 
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this objective, transparency is of paramount importance in the 
monitoring process.230 Monitoring standards should be objective 
and agreed upon in advance.231 Important considerations include 
how, by whom, and for what purposes monitoring is conducted.232 
The skill and expertise of the monitors themselves is relevant.233 
Typical compliance monitoring methods include self-reporting, 
informal statements of state conduct, or formal compliance 
inspections by impartial observers.234 
Self-reporting or informal statements of state conduct would 
not be reliable means of monitoring an economic espionage 
convention. Both represent “sunshine methods” of promoting 
compliance—that is, methods by which the potential reputational 
harm to a party promotes compliance.235 Such methods are 
unlikely to ensure the compliance of all members in the absence 
of further coercive factors, such as direct sanctions.236 The 
incentives for moral hazard in this context may be overwhelming. 
States suspected of economic espionage are reluctant to 
disclose their participation and would not self-report given their 
prior decision to participate in the conduct. An obvious failure to 
report would antagonize other parties and undermine the 
agreement’s credibility. Self-reporting should be encouraged, but 
could not be relied upon to an extent inconsistent with the 
proposed convention’s underlying objective of transparency. 
Informal statements of state conduct would create a similar 
problem. Any response to an informal statement is discretionary; 
                                                          
 230. See id. (listing transparency among generalized monitoring rules). 
 231. See id. (suggesting the use of “open and standardized measures 
for compliance” as a generalized monitoring rule). 
 232. Richard Locke, Fei Qin & Alberto Brause, Does Monitoring Improve 
Labor Standards?: Lessons from Nike 7 (MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 
4612-06), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=916771. 
 233. The skill and experience of an agreement’s monitors is a source of 
concern. Monitors may be experienced professionals, though they may 
also be “recent college graduates whose primary skill is . . . speaking a 
particular foreign language.” See id. at 6. 
 234. Guzman, supra note 203, at 585. 
 235. Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 792, 829 (2001). 
 236. See Andrew T. Guzman, Reputation and International Law, 34 GA. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 379, 387 (2006) (“The key point is to recognize that 
reputation acts at the margin, like all influences. If other relevant forces 
are sufficiently strong, they will swamp reputational concerns, but when 
other forces are less determinative, reputation can affect outcomes.”). 
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therefore, the reliability of such measures is questionable.237 A 
failure to comply would antagonize other parties and undermine 
the agreement’s credibility. 
Such informal methods may be justifiable when an agreement 
places onerous implementation costs on members. The proposed 
convention, however, has low implementation costs. 
                                                          
 237. For example, the OECD Convention relies exclusively on such 
means. See Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Country Reports on the 
Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the 1997 
Revised Recommendation, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3343,en_2649_37447_1933144_1_
1_1_37447,00.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2008)[hereinafter Country 
Reports]. Its reports do not initiate direct sanctions against member states 
that fail to effectively implement monitors’ recommendations. Only 
recommendations are forwarded to the government of each participating 
country. OCED Fighting, supra note 213. Consequently, member states 
enforcement records have not improved and many have yet to bring 
charges under domestic anti-bribery legislation. See generally Country 
Reports, supra at 237. Transparency International’s OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention Progress Reports 2007 and 2008 list the investigations 
performed by signatories dating back to 2006. Many countries have either 
performed no investigations or have not made information available as is 
required by the Convention. See generally Transparency International, 
Global Priorities: International Conventions, 
http://www.transparency.org/global_priorities/international_conventions 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2009). The 2008 Report notes “the lack of 
enforcement in over half of the countries is very disturbing.” 
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL: THE GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST CORRUPTION, 
PROGRESS REPORT 2008: OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 8 (June 24, 
2008), 
http://www.transparency.org/global_priorities/international_conventions
. 
In contrast, the WTO has adopted a comparatively formal monitoring 
procedure. Its Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) generally adopts the 
decisions of the body’s primary internal monitors, its “panels.” See WORLD 
TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: SETTLING DISPUTES 55–56 (2007), 
available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/utw_chap3_e.pdf. 
WTO panels consist of three or five experts from different states who 
examine evidence. The experts are fully independent. They cannot serve in 
their individual capacities, nor can they receive instructions from any 
government. Id. Panel reports may only be rejected by a DSB consensus, 
thus panel reports are difficult to overturn. This procedure has resulted in 
a positive compliance record among members.  Id at 58; see also Guzman, 
supra note 236, at 387 (“The key point is to recognize that reputation acts 
at the margin, like all influences. If other relevant forces are sufficiently 
strong, they will swamp reputational concerns, but when other forces are 
less determinative, reputation can affect outcomes.”); Bruce Wilson, 
Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse WTO Dispute Settlement 
Rulings: The Record to Date, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 397, 397 (2007). 
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Implementation would consist of a mere pledge to refrain from 
conducting economic espionage. The simplicity justifies a higher 
standard. 
This discussion suggests formal compliance inspections 
would be required to effectively monitor the proposed convention. 
Further discussion concerning the formal compliance mechanism 
follows in the section titled “Dispute Resolution Processes.” 
B. SANCTIONING PROCEDURES 
Sanctions are coercive means of altering a targeted state’s 
behavior. In the context of an international agreement, they are 
imposed as a result of a party’s infringement.238 Most 
international agreements do not employ sanctions as a 
compliance measure. When sanctions are called for, they are 
usually prospective and not strict enough to ensure 
compliance.239 The imposition of sanctions almost always 
represents a net welfare loss for the parties to the transaction—
not just the targeted party.240 Nevertheless, sanctions are a 
popular deterrence measure, as a failure to impose sanctions may 
lead to a reputation as a “pushover.”241 Sanctioning authority 
would increase a convention’s standing amongst governments and 
international organizations.242 Further, the drawbacks of 
sanctions are greatly reduced if applied as part of a multilateral 
regime.243 Sanctions may include financial or trade restrictions, 
monetary damages, withdrawals of intelligence-sharing privileges, 
formal diplomatic protests, or threats to cease other cooperative 
arrangements.244 
Trade restrictions should generally be avoided to the extent 
possible, as they negatively affect both the target and sanctioning 
party.245 They shift production to less efficient producers, 
restricting global output while raising prices for consumers.246 
                                                          
 238. Guzman, supra note 203, at 595–96. 
 239. Id. at 589. 
 240. Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance 
to Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 323 
(2002). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Charnovitz, supra note 235, at 809. 
 243. Jordan, supra note 197, at 339. 
 244. Goodman, supra note 201, at 95; see also Helfer, supra note 187, 
at 1618. 
 245. Guzman, supra note 240, at 323. 
 246. Trade Restrictions and their Effects, ECONOMIC EDUCATION WEB – 
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Worse still, trade restrictions are often met with retaliatory 
restrictions imposed by the target state.247 If trade restrictions are 
utilized, they are best imposed selectively.248 For example, tariffs 
or quotas could be placed on a target’s exports to correct 
unacceptable behavior without resorting to a comprehensive 
embargo. Provisional restrictions could be imposed on the product 
or services targeted by the espionage attempt in appropriate 
circumstances. Restricting visiting students’ and researchers’ 
landing rights or access to facilities would selectively target a 
popular intelligence gathering method, while limiting private 
investment by a target state’s citizens could frustrate foreign front 
companies’ attempts to establish a domestic foothold. Further 
still, a state’s eligibility for foreign aid or export finance programs 
could be affected by a decision to participate in economic 
espionage. 
Historically, states have been reluctant to include provisions 
calling for damages in their agreements.249 This is due in part to 
the difficulty in assessing damages in the context of most 
international agreements. This problem does not arise in the 
context of economic espionage. The damages arising from 
economic espionage are the losses attributable to the spying 
state’s activities.250 Monetary damages are preferable to trade 
retaliation because the obligation to pay the fine falls on the target 
and mitigates the harm to the sanctioning party.251 Further, 
pecuniary measures in the form of a fine are desirable. A fine 
penalizes a violation of law and is distinct from a monetary 
judgment awarded against a tortfeasor.252 Fines are rarely used as 
                                                          
UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA OMAHA, 
http://ecedweb.unomaha.edu/lessons/foegactivity1.htm (last visited Feb. 
27, 2009). 
 247. Id. 
 248. See, e.g., State Secretariat for Economic Affairs SECO, Smart 
Sanctions, 
http://www.seco.admin.ch/themen/00513/00620/00639/index.html?la
ng=en (last visited Dec. 2, 2008) (noting that targeted sanctions restrict 
“collateral damage” to civilian populations in target states). 
 249. Guzman, supra note 203, at 609. 
 250. See id. at 610 (stating that the use of monetary damages may be 
appropriate in those situations where “the harm is closely tied to 
economic harms”). 
 251. Charnovitz, supra note 235, at 827. 
 252. Id. at 825. 
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a compliance measure in international agreements,253 yet fines 
provide considerable incentive for parties to refrain from 
participating in economic espionage. Absent a fine, a party may 
weigh the potential reward of committing economic espionage 
against the prospect of accounting to the victim and accept the 
risk—a fine mitigates the prospect of scofflaws “breaking even” 
through their activities.254 To this end, a provision authorizing an 
assessment of double or treble damages may be advisable. 
Persistent disregard for the proposed convention’s terms 
would lead to expulsion.255 A threat of expulsion improves the 
likelihood parties would accept other compliance-inducing 
mechanisms.256 An expelled party would be unable to participate 
in negotiations, make use of a convention’s information-sharing 
network, or utilize its dispute resolution mechanisms.257 Further, 
any expulsion would be heavily publicized, thus promoting 
compliance by appealing to states’ reputational concerns. 
C. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES 
Dispute resolution processes (“DRPs”) facilitate compliance258 
by providing a mechanism through which monitoring and 
sanctioning procedures may be given effect. Such a mechanism 
would be essential to a convention prohibiting economic 
espionage. To start, the standing requirements under the 
proposed convention are addressed. Subsequently, the importance 
of a binding, expeditious DRP is discussed. Standing requirements 
vary widely among international DRPs. Options include (i) state 
espousal of a victim’s claim, (ii) a private right of action (“PRA”), or 
(iii) regulatory enforcement. Each is examined below. 
                                                          
 253. Id. 
 254. See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of 
International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1860–61 (2002). 
 255. Many international agreements contain provisions that limit or 
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1. State Espousal 
State espousal is a process by which a state effectively adopts 
a citizen’s claim and asserts his rights on his behalf.259 The 
decision to assert a claim is discretionary.260 Given states’ 
reluctance to publicly accuse others of economic espionage, state 
espousal could not reliably enforce the proposed convention. 
Businesses lacking the influence of more powerful lobbies may 
have difficulty persuading their government to respond to 
offenses.261 The process could lead to mutual non-enforcement, as 
diplomatic concerns may influence the decision to assert a claim. 
This is not a marked departure from the status quo. Ultimately, 
the process would undermine the proposed convention’s 
transparency and credibility. 
2. Private Right of Action 
A PRA would give economic espionage victims standing to 
assert a claim.262 When appropriate, a PRA may grant standing to 
an entity unconnected with the activities, such as an NGO, to 
seek redress for a public harm (a “public PRA”).263 PRAs obviate 
the mutual non-enforcement problem by removing prosecutorial 
discretion from the state.264 PRAs enhance the credibility of 
agreements by improving the prospect that a state will be 
penalized for noncompliance.265 On the other hand, PRAs restrict 
states’ sovereignty, which may cause states to resist compliance 
or abstain from participation.266 A PRA may limit opportunities to 
establish strategic direction and could slow the DRP by 
encouraging repetitive claims.267 
                                                          
 259. Philip M. Moremen, Private Rights of Action to Enforce Rules of 
International Regimes, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1127, 1174 (2006). 
 260. Id. 
 261. Alan O. Sykes, Public Versus Private Enforcement of International 
Economic Law: Standing and Remedy, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 631, 648 (2005). 
 262. Philip M. Moremen, Costs and Benefits of Adding a Private Right of 
Action to the World Trade Organization and the Montreal Protocol Dispute 
Resolution Systems, 11 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 189, 197 (2006). 
 263. Moremen, supra note 259, at 1133. 
 264. Id. at 1141. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Moreman, supra note 262, at 201. 
 267. Id. at 194. Moremen states that decentralized enforcement 
mechanisms, such as PRAs, are more efficient in some circumstances, 
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Such considerations must be balanced to determine whether 
a PRA would benefit the proposed convention. Philip Moremen 
suggests a PRA is most effective when (a) states desire increased 
enforcement, (b) plaintiffs are adequately incentivized, and (c) 
sovereignty costs are minimal.268 In the absence of one or more of 
these factors, he suggests a PRA may still be beneficial if (d) the 
advantages of strict enforcement exceed the disadvantages or 
states want to make a credible commitment.269 This framework 
applies to the proposed convention as follows: 
(a) The desire for increased enforcement of an economic 
espionage convention would vary among states. Habitual 
practitioners would likely resist a PRA, while those most 
victimized by the practice would be motivated to limit it. Support 
for increased enforcement would be strong amongst the Western 
states likely to comprise a convention’s initial membership. 
(b) Whether private plaintiffs are adequately incentivized to 
assert claims is debatable. Adjusting the incentives to encourage 
them to do so is difficult.270 Victims appear highly motivated to 
bring claims, as their proprietary information has been 
compromised. However, as discussed, economic espionage victims 
are often reluctant complainants. The creation of a public PRA 
would seemingly target this problem. However, public PRAs are 
most effective when there is an active NGO community willing to 
bring claims.271 As will be discussed, NGOs have been indifferent 
towards economic espionage to date. Providing for anonymity in 
the process could also target this problem, though doing so would 
undermine the proposed convention’s transparency objectives. A 
state may look to capitalize on its citizens’ anonymity, 
complicating the task of linking a state to its questionable 
conduct. 
(c) Sovereignty costs are lower in matters of low politics (e.g., 
economic matters) than high politics (e.g., state security).272 
                                                          
costs of piecemeal enforcement by private parties.” Id. at 193. 
 268. Moreman, supra note 259, at 1130. 
 269. Id. at 1177. 
 270. Moremen, supra note 262, at 225. 
 271. Moremen, supra note 259, at 1177. 
 272. Id. at 1178; see generally Norrin M. Ripsman, False Dichotomy: 
When Low Politics is High Politics (Mar. 17, 2004) (unpublished 
manuscript presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies 
Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada (Feb. 6, 
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Economic espionage is a matter of high politics. Its practice is 
considered by many to be vital to state security. The fact that no 
minimum obligations regarding economic espionage exist at the 
international level suggests states are reluctant to relinquish 
sovereignty in this area, as they have not previously done so.273 
The role of state secrets privilege in the process is problematic. 
States concerned about exposure to spurious claims or disclosure 
of sensitive information may favor a regulatory body, though 
enabling a secretariat to screen claims for their legitimacy could 
manage the former concern.274 
(d) The benefits of strict enforcement exceed any 
disadvantages. Because the proposed convention prescribes an 
absolute prohibition, flexibility, leading to uneven application, 
would damage its credibility. States require a credible 
commitment. This would minimize the prospects of non-
compliance by others, reducing the opportunity cost of 
participation. The likelihood of states’ indiscretions going 
unpunished, while compliant states look on, would be decreased. 
A PRA would signal a state’s intention to take an obligation 
seriously.275 
3. Regulatory Enforcement 
Alternatively, a convention could be enforced through the 
establishment of a regulatory body to investigate and prosecute 
violations.276 The body, as opposed to private parties, would have 
standing to commence an action.277 In regulatory systems, 
matters are usually referred to an internal administrative body or 
an independent tribunal for adjudication.278 
A regulatory mechanism addresses the problems of mutual 
non-enforcement and private party reluctance by assigning 
prosecutorial discretion to the regulator. More often than not, 
                                                          
 273. Cf. D. Daniel Sokol, Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why 
Countries Enter Into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free 
Trade Agreements, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 231, 260–61 (2008) (considering 
inadequate minimum economic espionage obligations in the context of the 
lack of international antitrust commitments, but the same reasoning 
applies). 
 274. Moremen, supra note 262, at 222. 
 275. Moremen, supra note 259, at 1177. 
 276. Id. at 1136. 
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regulators possess greater resources and investigative powers 
than do private parties,279 and benefit from economies of scale.280 
While private parties possess an informational advantage over 
regulators when the offender’s identity is known, they are 
comparatively disadvantaged when it is unknown.281 Alas, this is 
often the case in circumstances of economic espionage. 
Regulators have a wide discretion in terms of both 
enforcement decisions and options.282 This flexibility could 
present states more opportunity to influence the enforcement 
process, counteracting the proposed convention’s transparency 
objectives.283 To be effective, a convention would require 
provisions limiting the discretion of its regulators. Predictable, 
uniform enforcement would be critical. 
Private party participation in the enforcement process is not 
limited to PRAs. Regulatory mechanisms may permit participation 
directly, through the right to observe proceedings, or indirectly, 
through the use of amicus briefs.284 Such measures would 
improve transparency while avoiding the problems associated with 
multiple plaintiffs that may arise under a PRA. 
A final consideration is whether non-member states should 
have standing to assert claims under the proposed convention. At 
first glance, a PRA is helpful. Denying any victim of economic 
espionage standing seems unfair, given the proposed convention’s 
goal of eliminating the practice. This is particularly so if the 
perpetrator is a member state. Regardless, access to the DRP is an 
incentive to participate in the proposed convention. If non-
member states could access the DRP in these circumstances, the 
incentive for membership is diminished. Also, domestic pressure 
on non-member governments to join an economic espionage 
convention would presumably intensify as citizens increasingly 
demand redress. A regulatory regime would strike a balance 
between punishing non-compliance and promoting convention 
participation. 
4. Recommendation on Standing and Other Considerations 
This analysis suggests a regulatory enforcement mechanism 
                                                          
 279. Id. at 1143. 
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 282. Id. at 1130. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Moremen, supra note 262, at 214. 
DANIELSON MEA.  Economic Espionage: A Framework for a Workable Solution.  MINN. 
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2009;10(2): 503-548. 
540 MINN J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 10:2 
 
 
is preferable. The advantages of a PRA could be reasonably 
approximated by a carefully-crafted regulatory mechanism. This 
conclusion is supported by the remarks of others.285 There remain 
further aspects of the DRP that must be considered. 
The DRP must bind parties to any dispute. Referred or 
submitted disputes must produce a final decision that cannot be 
unilaterally avoided by any member.286 In agreements with strict 
sanctions, such as the proposed convention, this is particularly 
important. Historically, states have been reluctant to submit to 
binding dispute adjudication,287 particularly when the stakes are 
high.288 This reluctance may stem from states’ desire to preserve 
control of disputes or may be due to the fear of losing a binding 
verdict.289 However, states are more willing to submit to binding 
dispute resolution in the multilateral context and when the 
relevant tribunal’s accuracy is recognized.290 The bias against 
binding dispute resolution is waning and the practice is gaining a 
broader appeal.291 Significantly, the Western states likely to 
compose a convention’s initial membership are traditionally 
proponents of binding dispute resolution.292 
Also, the DRP must operate expeditiously. The slow pace of 
DRPs in international agreements is a frequent complaint.293 In 
                                                          
 285. See, e.g., Michelle Sandilands, Key Laws Governing the Practice of 
Competitive Intelligence in Global Business, in COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE 
AND GLOBAL BUSINESS 82–83 (David L. Blenkhorn & Craig S. Fleisher eds., 
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 286. Anne Peters, International Dispute Settlement: A Network of 
Cooperational Duties, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2003). 
 287. Id. at 30; see also Guzman, supra note 240, at 304 (“A survey of 
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United Nations Treaty Series yielded 80 treaties without a mandatory 
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 288. Guzman, supra note 240, at 303. 
 289. Guzman, supra note 203, at 593–94. 
 290. Guzman, supra note 240, at 303. 
 291. Peters, supra note 286, at 30. 
 292. Id. 
 293. See, e.g., International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and 
Agricultural Implement 
Workers of America: Hearing on Accession of China to the WTO Before the 
H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th  Cong. (2000) (statement of Alan 
Reuther, Legislative Director for the International Union, United 
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America), 
available at 
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this context, quick resolution is important, as stolen information 
may be swiftly assimilated into a competing product or service 
and leveraged into a sustained competitive advantage.294 Prompt 
decisions could prevent or mitigate the damage to victims of 
economic espionage.295 To this end, distinct timeframes for 
resolution would be prescribed by the agreement. 
D. ADMISSION & EXIT 
Successful “public goods” agreements encourage 
participation.296 Therefore, a convention should deal strictly with 
economic—not industrial—espionage. Recall that economic 
espionage has an element of state participation, while private 
parties commit industrial espionage. By limiting the proposed 
convention’s scope to a matter directly within each state’s 
control—the decision to commit economic espionage—
membership is made available to a broader range of parties. 
States lacking the resources to effectively police industrial 
espionage would agree to refrain from participating in the 
practice. States would be responsible for contributing to the 
monitoring and enforcement of a convention, but the costs of 
policing economic espionage would be minimal, as states’ 
involvement would be reduced. At worst, industrial thieves would 
have fewer willing buyers to pay for their information. This is 
significant, as governments are often the only suitors for stolen 
information.297 
The proposed convention would prohibit all state involvement 
in the processes of economic espionage, including the passive 
receipt of information. As discussed, states are increasingly 
making use of information gathered by the private sector. 
Refraining from economic espionage while making use of 
unsolicited information would be incongruous with the purpose of 
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the proposed convention. A single purchase of such information 
would undermine its integrity and signal to industrial thieves the 
state implicitly encourages such behavior. Member states would 
be unable to utilize information one should reasonably suspect 
was obtained through suspect tactics. Conceivably, states might 
engage in a “final” economic espionage venture prior to seeking 
membership. To deter such conduct, a state would require a 
record of compliant behavior for a period of time prior to 
membership. 
Reservations entitling states to exclusive benefits would be 
impermissible. Such measures transform agreements into 
“kaleidoscope[s] of a la carte legal commitments”298 and would be 
incompatible with the required uniform application of the 
proposed convention. There is a rebuttable presumption at 
international law prohibiting exit from an agreement that does not 
permit withdrawal.299 The proposed convention would not permit 
withdrawal. This would “weed out states that are less serious 
about future compliance.”300 To conclusively put an end to 
economic espionage, the proposed convention would be 
permanent. This would help ensure the cooperation of all states 
into the future.301 As discussed, persistent disregard for its terms 
would lead to expulsion. Expelled states would be unable to 
reclaim membership status for a prescribed period of time. This 
would discourage opportunistic behavior by precluding member 
states from accepting the consequences of a one-time violation 
and then subsequently reapplying for membership. 
VI. OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION 
Participation poses a dilemma for some states. Ultimately, all 
states would reap the benefits of an economic espionage 
convention in the long-term by way of improved global stability 
and an accelerated rate of innovation. However, “public goods” 
agreements encounter a unique problem. States that do not 
participate in the production of a public good (i.e., join the 
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proposed convention) would nonetheless benefit from its 
production.302 Less-Developed States (“LDSs”) have little incentive 
to participate given that economic espionage is profitable to 
participants303 and saves the time and the financial resources 
required to develop technologies independently.304 A movement for 
change will not come from states desperate to catch their more 
successful neighbors. LDSs may ignore reputational concerns to 
engage in economic espionage and free-ride off the gains made 
publicly available by a convention.305 This would be rational for a 
LDS already suffering from a poor reputation for corruption or 
integrity. Under such circumstances, it is anticipated many states 
would abstain from membership. 
This problem is solvable. It may be confronted by offering 
member states privileges unavailable to non-complying members 
and non-members.306 For example, members would have access 
to the information-sharing network and DSP previously described, 
in addition to other cooperative opportunities. Another equally 
important incentive would reveal itself over time. In due course, 
states may covet the reputational benefits of membership. The 
international community would view states that subscribe to the 
proposed convention in a positive light. A positive reputation 
enhances the credibility of a state’s promises,307 providing greater 
leverage in international negotiations and broadening the range of 
available cooperative opportunities.308 Reputational concerns have 
been shown to be an important factor in a state’s decision to 
                                                          
 302. Once a “public good” is established, the cost to producers to 
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 304. Sepura, supra note 5, at 133. 
 305. See Setear, supra note 302. 
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 308. Id. at 385. 
DANIELSON MEA.  Economic Espionage: A Framework for a Workable Solution.  MINN. 
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2009;10(2): 503-548. 
544 MINN J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 10:2 
 
 
comply with its obligations.309 LDSs striving to improve 
international reputations may find non-membership too costly to 
endure. Further, LDSs have more to lose to economic espionage 
as they develop. As development takes place, it is anticipated that 
states will increasingly seek to protect their assets through 
international law.310 Further still, as more states subscribe to the 
proposed convention, the more conspicuous non-members would 
become. A shrinking pool of non-members would immediately be 
suspected in the event of any economic espionage incident. Thus, 
a convention benefits from a kind of virtuous cycle. 
Another factor that must be considered is that the success of 
“public goods” agreements is frequently contingent on the level of 
participation.311 In other words, a convention’s success could turn 
depending on how many states subscribe to the agreement. If 
states doubt one another’s willingness to comply with a 
convention, participation may be a problem from the outset. This 
difficulty may be confronted in two ways. First, the proposed 
convention would adopt strong compliance measures that would 
increase the prospects of cooperation by making misbehavior 
more costly.312 It is not uncommon for a state to adopt an 
agreement as a means of compelling its own compliance while 
signaling to others its intention to adhere to its terms.313  Second, 
a convention could require a ratification threshold taking into 
account a prescribed number of states, their size, or their relative 
financial contributions, before entering into force.314 Such 
measures have been shown to create “treaty bandwagons” which 
facilitate the cooperative process.315 This compromise may help 
resolve a stalemate between states reluctant to bind themselves 
until others do likewise. 
VII. GAINING MOMENTUM 
A convention would need the backing of the U.S. Government, 
businesses, and NGOs to gain momentum. The Government has 
acknowledged, through the creation of the Economic Espionage 
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 310. WERT, supra note 30, at 4. 
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Act, that economic espionage is a serious problem. The FBI has 
stated that economic espionage is a priority second only to 
terrorism.316 U.S. businesses, which have had to bear the cost of 
these thefts, have voiced their frustrations. Commentators, 
appreciating the shortcomings of domestic law, have observed that 
further steps to combat economic espionage may have to occur at 
the international level. However, NGO support for this notion is 
lacking. NGOs play a crucial role in the establishment of 
international norms317 and the development and implementation 
of international agreements.318 NGO support is a prerequisite to 
establishing a consensus among the international community that 
economic espionage is an unwelcome practice. 
There are various reasons for this lack of support. Most NGOs 
are concerned with monitoring domestic practices and do not 
possess the resources or mandate to think globally.319 The 
symbiotic relationship320 between NGOs and the media compels 
them to focus on hot-button issues that generate public interest 
and garner support for their cause.321 This is worrying, as 
problems lacking journalistic appeal may be nonetheless 
damaging. Further, a dependence on funding or the preferences of 
members may determine the issues with which NGOs deal.322 
Finally, while NGOs are less encumbered by the difficulties states 
encounter in publicly accusing other states of misconduct,323 they 
must still consider the consequences of publicly accusing states of 
misconduct versus the benefits of working “behind the scenes” to 
modify states’ behaviors.324 Like inter-state relationships, 
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 324. Id. at 220. 
DANIELSON MEA.  Economic Espionage: A Framework for a Workable Solution.  MINN. 
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2009;10(2): 503-548. 
546 MINN J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 10:2 
 
 
relations between NGOs and states may occur on different levels 
simultaneously. This may help explain why certain NGOs, which 
ostensibly would be opposed to economic espionage, have been 
reluctant to address it.325 Abstaining from publicly criticizing a 
state may be provident for an NGO working “behind the scenes” to 
improve a state’s compliance in other areas. Fresh allegations may 
embarrass the state and hurt the relationship the NGO has 
worked to foster. As the norms these NGOs are working towards 
become universally accepted, attention may shift to combating the 
problem of economic espionage. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Superficially, economic espionage has a zero sum outcome: 
one state’s loss is another’s gain. A broader examination reveals 
otherwise. It discourages innovation326 by eroding businesses’ 
hard-earned competitive advantage.327 It reduces profitability,328 
forcing businesses to recoup losses by raising costs to 
consumers.329 Businesses, already undercut by lower production 
costs overseas, may not be viable after factoring in the cost of 
these thefts. Economic espionage unquestionably raises tensions 
between states330 and challenges the security and stability of 
sovereign states.331 
Disturbingly, the practice is on the rise globally. Domestic 
legislation has not adequately addressed the problem. This is 
evidenced by the fact that despite the escalation of economic 
espionage, the number of prosecutions under the EEA can be 
counted on one hand.332 Governments have placed the burden on 
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businesses to secure their assets to the utmost degree, which is 
laudable. However, no business possesses the resources, 
financially or otherwise, to continuously fend off a state intent on 
stealing its valuable secrets.333 Economic espionage is 
unregulated at the international level; the only level where it can 
be effectively enforced.334 
This deficiency could be corrected by establishing a 
convention prohibiting economic espionage. The prevalent view is 
that economic espionage cannot be effectively regulated due to 
states’ inherent interest in conducting the activity and the 
difficulty in detecting such a surreptitious practice. These 
positions are debatable. First, states are increasingly willing to 
jointly endeavor to eliminate destructive business practices that 
are independently profitable. The contemporary business 
environment is more hospitable to agreements that challenge the 
status quo. Second, enforcement difficulties would be addressed 
through the strength of the commitment. The consequences of 
non-compliance would be sufficient to deter transgressions at the 
outset. Further, the surreptitious nature of other undesirable 
business practices, like bribery, has not discouraged regulation 
efforts. 
The proposed framework has been informed by the structure 
of other international agreements. A convention would feature 
swift and binding dispute resolution with regulatory oversight. 
Independent monitors who are not merely relegated to an advisory 
role would inform the body. Targeted sanctions would be imposed 
against non-complying states, with monetary damages and fines 
providing the primary incentive for compliance. Ultimately, the 
measures adopted should make economic espionage not worth the 
risk. Stern measures are justified by the fact that economic 
espionage is deliberate; transgressions would not arise by mistake 
or by a lack of capacity to comply. 
Given that domestic prosecutions have been 
disproportionately low to the level of activity, a proposal to 
address the problem at the international level would presumably 
generate interest. So far, this has not been the case. Economic 
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espionage has not been made a priority by any NGO, and as such, 
the practice continues unabated. My purpose is not to rebuke 
those remaining dormant, but to question why the problem has 
not received attention. Economic espionage is as destructive and 
costly as other undesirable business practices that have garnered 
attention of late, yet no more difficult to address. 
Solving the underlying causes of economic espionage—
corruption, poverty, and resource disparity—is not easy.335 It is 
intuitively obvious theft is not the answer. The proposed 
convention would not eliminate the risk of industrial theft, though 
it would go a long way towards ensuring that governments do not 
remain accomplices to such activities. 
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